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RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION AND SHARED
COMPLIANCE: LESSONS FROM TITLE IV OF
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Michael Steven Stein* and Emily Teplin**
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years after the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was
enacted, the state of communication access for deaf people is the tale of
two ADAs.1 Consider the hypothetical circumstance of a deaf man who
has moved to a new town and needs to find a new dentist. After
identifying a dentist who has received favorable reviews online, the deaf
man turns on his videophone and enters the dental office’s phone
number. His telephone call is automatically routed to a call operating
center which connects him to an American Sign Language (“ASL”)
interpreter within five seconds. The interpreter communicates with the
deaf man in ASL through her own videophone, but she also wears a
headset connected to a telephone. She introduces herself to the deaf
man, gives him her interpreter identification number, and then initiates
the call by dialing the requested phone number.

Partner, Stein & Vargas, LLP. Prior to joining Stein & Vargas, LLP, which specializes
in disability discrimination including discrimination against deaf individuals, Stein was a
Skadden Fellow with the National Association of the Deaf.
**
Law Clerk for the Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota. Teplin previously represented deaf and hard of hearing people as an
Equal Justice Works Fellow at the Minnesota Disability Law Center. The authors thank
Marc Charmatz, Michele Friedner, Nicholas Hengen, Heidi Kitrosser, Rick Macpherson,
Ortal Meir, John Stanton, and Julie Wilensky for their helpful critiques and suggestions.
1
For the sake of convenience, we will generally use the term “deaf” in this Article to
refer to individuals who communicate primarily in ASL. However, the word “deaf”
actually applies to individuals with a widely diverse range of communication styles and
preferences, not all of whom sign. Communication preferences range from spoken English
to Signed Exact English to Cued Speech, to name but a few. See Michael A. Schwartz, Deaf
Patients, Doctors, and the Law: Compelling a Conversation About Communication, 35 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 947, 948 n.1 (2008) (stating that estimates of signing deaf people range from 300,000
to 2,000,000). Moreover, the phrase “deaf people” may include those individuals who are
deaf, hard of hearing, deaf-blind, and late deafened. Many deaf individuals who identify
as culturally deaf and communicate primarily in ASL refer to themselves as Deaf (with the
capitalized ‘D’) to emphasize their position as a linguistic and cultural minority. See
generally CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA: VOICES FROM A CULTURE
(1988). Since not all deaf people identify as Deaf, we adopt the more general term deaf.
While this Article is focused on access to interpreter services for deaf people who
communicate primarily in ASL, the bulk of our discussion is equally applicable to access
for a wide range of deaf and hard of hearing people who do not know sign language and
may benefit instead from other forms of accommodation such as captioning.
*
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The dentist’s receptionist answers the phone. The interpreter
introduces the call, explaining that the caller is using ASL and that she
will facilitate communication between him and the hearing caller. The
interpreter then “connects” the call, and the deaf man states his name in
sign language and asks to schedule an appointment. The receptionist,
using nothing but his voice and regular telephone, discusses
appointment dates with the deaf man through the interpreter. When the
appointment has been booked, the deaf man signs his request that the
office provide a sign language interpreter during the appointment. The
receptionist puts the call on hold to consult with the dentist, who
performs a simple cost-benefit analysis: the office charges $120 for a
basic dental hygiene visit and consultation with an approximate net
profit of $50. The cost of a sign language interpreter in her area is $45
per hour with a two-hour minimum. The dentist concludes that she will
“lose” money—$40, representing the cost of the visit ($120) minus typical
expenditures ($70) and the cost of the interpreter ($90)—on the deaf
patient. She instructs the receptionist to tell him that he is welcome to
make an appointment but that her office will not provide an interpreter;
instead, the dentist will communicate with him by writing notes back
and forth.
There are two ADAs in this story: (1) the law that enabled the deaf
man to place, for free, a telephone call and book a dental appointment in
ASL with the same ease as a hearing person, and (2) the law that was
supposed to, but ultimately did not, ensure the deaf man effective
communication with the dentist during his actual appointment.
Although the dentist offered to write notes back and forth with the deaf
man, writing may not result in effective communication if the deaf man’s
primary means of communication is ASL, a visual language entirely
distinct from English, with its own grammar and syntax.2 Moreover,
even if the deaf man has a good command of English (as do many deaf
and hard of hearing people), the slow process of writing notes may
severely limit the extent and complexity of the interactive dialogue that
the dentist typically has with hearing patients. The dentist’s analysis
focused not on which means of communication would result in effective
communication but rather on identifying her cheapest option.
This tale of two ADAs turns on economic incentives. The deaf man’s
call was regulated by Title IV of the ADA, which requires common
See, e.g., EEOC v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 620 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[ASL’s] grammar and syntax differ from the grammar and syntax of English and other
spoken languages. In many cases, there is no one-to-one correspondence between signs in
ASL and words in the English language.” (citations omitted)); Calloway v. Boro of
Glassboro Dep’t of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547 n.9 (D.N.J. 2000).

2
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carriers to ensure functionally equivalent telephone services for people
with hearing and speech impairments.3 The Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”), which is charged with implementing Title IV,
established a regulatory regime that assesses a tax on all common
carriers for this purpose. The resulting revenues contribute to a fund
which compensates relay service providers for their services. Relay
service providers can turn a profit by providing free relay services for
deaf people wishing to call hearing individuals and then seeking
reimbursement from the relay service fund; indeed, the relay services
industry now generates nearly $1 billion per year. Providers therefore
compete for the privilege of providing free sign language interpreters for
the deaf man to call his dentist.
But what economic motive existed for the dentist to pay for an
interpreter to communicate with her deaf patient during the actual
appointment? None, except perhaps the fear of litigation. Title III of the
ADA requires places of public accommodations, such as a dental office,
to pay for qualified interpreters when necessary to ensure effective
communication with a deaf person.4 The law prohibits the dentist from
charging her deaf patient for the cost of interpreter services.5 Although a
dentist’s office may assert the affirmative defense that providing
interpreter services for a deaf patient who requests them poses an
“undue burden,”6 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has taken the
position that covered entities cannot simply compare the cost of the
interpreter with the likely revenue from the deaf individual’s business,
as the dentist in our hypothetical did.7 Rather, “undue burden” factors
include the covered entity’s overall resources and the availability of tax
credits to compensate the entity for part of the cost.8 It is doubtful that
the dentist could establish that “losing” approximately $40 for a single
office visit posed an undue burden.9 The dentist likely violated Title III
by refusing to provide an interpreter for the deaf man’s visit.
However, as we discuss in this Article, dentists as well as lawyers
and innumerable other entities covered by the ADA routinely make
precisely the same calculation our hypothetical dentist made despite the
47 U.S.C. § 225 (2006).
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2006).
5
28 C.F.R. § 36.301(c) (2010).
6
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
7
See Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to Sen. Joseph I.
Lieberman (Sept. 8, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/foia/readingroom/
frequent_requests/ada_tal/tal801.php.
8
See id. Limited tax credits are codified at 26 U.S.C. § 44 (2006).
9
We are aware of no court that has held, as a matter of law, that providing interpreter
services constitutes an undue burden under the ADA.
3
4
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specter of liability.10 Even large entities with presumably deeper
pockets, including multinational corporations and governmental
agencies, which are also required to provide auxiliary aids such as
interpreter services to ensure equal access to its services,11 bristle at the
cost of communicating effectively with deaf people.12
It is easy to see why the ADA is often referred to as an “unfunded
mandate.”13 Under Titles I through III, the cost of paying for interpreter
services and other means of ensuring effective communication with deaf
people generally falls to those entities that happen to be approached by
individual deaf people. Entities perform a cost-benefit analysis that
often leads them to risk liability and refuse to pay, even when the cost of
making their services accessible would not be overly burdensome.
We do not mean to downplay the successes that the ADA has had in
opening many doors for deaf people. Many covered entities now
provide auxiliary aids and services as a matter of course. The workplace,
government services, and the marketplace are generally much more
accessible today than they were before the ADA was enacted. However,
we observe that while many covered entities do in fact comply with the
ADA, there remains a sizeable number of entities which do not fulfill
their legal obligations to ensure communication access, and thus
equality, for deaf people.
The hard fact remains that after twenty years, deaf people still
struggle to access employment opportunities, government services, and
public accommodations in a manner commensurate with that enjoyed by
hearing people. By contrast, Title IV has ensured virtually uniform
industry-wide ADA compliance and readily available tools for hearing
and deaf people to communicate with each other with ease through relay
services. Our aim in this Article is to explain why Title IV has been so
much more effective in achieving its goals than Titles I through III.
In this Article, we expand on the tale of two ADAs and offer our
simple hypothesis:
deaf people enjoy greater access to
telecommunication services than they do in any other context because
Title IV mandates that the entire telecommunications industry share the
10
See infra Part II.B.3. Indeed, the facts of this hypothetical are loosely based on
Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Mich. 1994), a representative case discussed
at some length below.
11
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182; 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130, 35.160, 36.303 (2010).
12
See, e.g., Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 1999) (identifying the state
correctional department as asserting undue burden to provide sign language interpreter for
deaf prisoner to attend hearings, medical appointments, and educational programs).
13
See, e.g., Russell Powell, Beyond Lane: Who is Protected by the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Who Should Be?, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 25, 53 (2004) (referencing the ADA’s requirement
that employers provide reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities).
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cost of communication access regardless of which company’s services
deaf people use. Titles I through III, in contrast, generally impose the
cost on individual covered entities only when they encounter deaf
people.
In Part II, we summarize the requirements of Titles I through III as
they pertain to deaf people. Communication barriers pose the greatest
hindrance to the inclusion of deaf people in society, and the ADA
requires effective communication and the provision of auxiliary aids and
services as a means of achieving equality. These access mandates have
resulted in greater access for deaf people, but rampant noncompliance
and underenforcement of Titles I through III have severely hindered full
inclusion of deaf people in all aspects of society.
In Part III, we discuss how the successes of Titles I through III have
been limited by the perpetuation of economic disincentives in the context
of disability rights in general, and deaf communication access in
particular. The ADA locates the “problem” of disability in the
environment rather than in the person with a disability, and accordingly
imposes costs associated with redressing inaccessibility on entities that
foster the inaccessible or disabling environments. Like traditional
antidiscrimination law, the ADA prohibits discrimination even when it is
economically rational, but equality for deaf people requires real,
quantifiable, ongoing expenditures. We agree with those scholars who
argue that, as an antidiscrimination law, the ADA appropriately requires
covered entities to take the necessary steps to ensure effective
communication. However, we also argue that increased compliance
with the law, which will translate into increased accessibility for deaf
people, requires a broader and preemptive redistribution of the cost of
communication access.
We turn in Part IV to the “other” ADA, Title IV, which provides a
powerful illustration of what happens when the law compels an entire
industry to share the cost of communication access and to do so in
anticipation of—rather than in response to—encounters with deaf
people. The enforcement failures of the other titles of the ADA contrast
with the overall success of Title IV. Title IV’s shared funding mechanism
has resulted in the near complete accessibility of telecommunications
and a vibrant marketplace for relay service providers competing to
provide the best services to deaf people. Relay services are not without
flaws—in our experience, most deaf people strongly prefer on-site
interpreter services to interpreters who appear remotely via video feed—
but the ubiquitous compliance issues in the context of Titles I through III
are conspicuously absent when it comes to Title IV.
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In Part V, we present some illustrations of how entities covered by
Titles I through III of the ADA have semi-voluntarily (often as the result
of settling lawsuits) adopted Title IV’s principle of sharing the cost of
communication access.
In Part VI, we explore other potential
opportunities to expand the success of Title IV beyond telephone access
while also acknowledging their limits. Our primary goal is to explain
how Title IV’s shared compliance mandate works to address the
entrenched problem of economically rational discrimination in Titles I
through III and to suggest several ways to expand on its success.
II. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION
A. Legal Requirements of Titles I–III
We begin with a brief overview of the best-known provisions of the
ADA, specifically as they apply to deaf individuals. The ADA is
intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”14
It prohibits discrimination in “three major areas of public life”:
employment (Title I), public services (Title II), and public
accommodations (Title III).15 For deaf people who communicate
primarily in sign language, the ADA seeks to achieve full inclusion by
establishing a right to effective communication through the provision of
auxiliary aids and services which include sign language interpreters and
captioning.
Title I prohibits employment discrimination “on the basis of
disability.”16 Under Title I, discrimination includes an employer’s failure
to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is
an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity.”17 Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations define reasonable
accommodations as “[m]odifications or adjustments that enable a
covered entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and
privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated
employees without disabilities.”18 Reasonable accommodations and
modifications vary based on the individual deaf employee or applicant’s
14
15
16
17
18
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circumstances; frequently they involve interpreter services for meetings
and training sessions,19 but they may also encompass unusual requests,
such as a fan for a factory worker whose hearing aid was negatively
affected by “steam-induced perspiration.”20
Title II provides that deaf people shall not “be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.”21 Title II’s regulations, promulgated by the DOJ,22 specify that
public entities must “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services
where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal
opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service,
program, or activity.”23
Moreover, they must ensure that
“communications with applicants, participants, and members of the
public with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.”24
Auxiliary aids can include the services of a qualified interpreter,
telecommunication devices or personal device assistants, or even writing
on a pen and paper or employing gestures to communicate.25 The
“length and complexity of the communication” determines the
appropriate method for providing effective communication.26
Accordingly, the law may be violated when a public entity relies on
written notes to communicate when interpreter services are necessary to
ensure effective communication under the particular circumstances.27
Moreover, in determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is
necessary for a given circumstance, public entities are required to give
“primary consideration” to the request of the deaf person.28 A public
entity must normally honor the request of the deaf person unless it can
See, e.g., EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999).
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 257–58 (1st Cir. 1999).
21
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
22
The EEOC promulgates regulations for Title I, the employment provision of the ADA,
while the DOJ is responsible for Titles II and III. Regulations for Title IV, discussed in
depth below, are under the auspices of the Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”).
23
28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (2010).
24
Id. § 35.160(a) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Boyer v. Tift Cnty. Hosp. Auth., No. 7:06-cv027, 2008 WL 2986283, at *5 (M.D. Ga. July 31, 2008) (“The [Title II] regulations charge
Defendant hospital with the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that it could
communicate with Plaintiff as effectively as it could communicate with its hearing patients.
Further, Defendant hospital was responsible for furnishing Plaintiff with a qualified
interpreter—if she so desired—so she could be properly treated while hospitalized.”).
25
28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
26
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADA TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL COVERING STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND SERVICES § II-7.1000 (1993), available at
http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-7.1000.
27
See, e.g., Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F. Supp. 2d 863 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
28
28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2).
19
20
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demonstrate that another effective means of communication exists or
that the use of the requested communication method would result in a
“fundamental alteration” of its program or service or would impose an
undue financial or administrative burden.29
Title III likewise requires public accommodations to ensure effective
communication with deaf individuals through the provision of auxiliary
aids and services.30 Public accommodations are typically asked to ensure
effective communication through the provision of auxiliary aids and
services such as sign language interpreters,31 but the law also applies to
structural modifications such as a sign at a drive-thru restaurant menu
instructing deaf patrons to proceed to the window.32 Unlike Title II, Title
III does not include regulatory language compelling the entity to afford
“primary consideration” to the deaf person’s request for a particular
means of communication. The public accommodation is ultimately
responsible for deciding which, if any, auxiliary aids or services to
employ, but it maintains legal responsibility for providing
communication as effective as communication with others.33
Small businesses34 are eligible for a fifty percent tax credit up to
$5,000 for making expenditures to comply with the ADA, including
paying for auxiliary aids and services such as interpreter services and
captioning.35 After spending $250, they may take a fifty percent tax
credit on expenditures up to $10,250. This scheme, however, still leaves
businesses liable for the majority of expenses, especially as they may
encounter deaf consumers infrequently and not spend enough to qualify
for the tax credit or for more than a small portion of the tax credit. In
addition, it is entirely unavailable to government agencies and larger
businesses.36

29
Id. § 35.164; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,183 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35).
30
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
31
See, e.g., Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2009).
32
Bunjer v. Edwards, 985 F. Supp. 165, 166 (D.D.C. 1997).
33
See Kerr v. Heather Gardens Ass’n, No. 09-cv-00409-MSK-MJW, 2010 WL 3791484, at
*4 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2010) (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B) (“[C]ommunication with the
disabled individual must be as effective as that with a non-disabled individual. Use of the
most advanced technology is not required, however, as long as the accommodation
selected results in effective communication.” (internal citations omitted)).
34
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 44(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (stating that “eligible small business[es]” are
those with either gross receipts not exceeding $1,000,000 or businesses which do not
employ more than thirty full-time employees).
35
See id.
36
Id. (indicating that by its terms, the tax provision applies only to “eligible small
business[es]”).
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B. The Extent of Noncompliance
The ADA has resulted in the greater inclusion of deaf people in
society. Not all covered entities refuse to provide sign language
interpreters and other auxiliary aids upon request so that they can
communicate effectively with deaf people.
Our focus is on
noncompliance not because we think Titles I through III have entirely
failed in their laudable goals, but because we think that the ADA can be
made much more effective than it has been in its first twenty years.
It is difficult to measure the precise extent of noncompliance with
Titles I through III. We do not attempt to undertake an empirical study
of how and when covered entities decide to provide auxiliary aids and
services. We note, however, that there is a strong consensus among
scholars and empirical evidence suggesting that the ADA generally—not
just as it applies to deaf people—is subject to widespread
noncompliance.37
In our personal experiences representing deaf individuals across the
country, we have had deaf clients tell us that they contacted a dozen or
more doctors before they found one willing to provide sign language
interpreters. We have observed that entities are not always willing to
hire an interpreter immediately after an initial request and will instead
insist that a less costly approach, such as writing notes, results in equally
effective communication even when voluminous amounts of information
are being provided or the deaf person lacks strong reading and writing
skills.
Our anecdotal experiences are supported by a wealth of case law in
which entities both large and small in a variety of contexts refuse to
ensure effective communication. Below, we examine illustrative cases
litigated under each of the first three titles of the ADA involving the
refusal by covered entities to provide sign language interpreters.
1.

EEOC v. Federal Express Corp.38

Ronald Lockhart is deaf and his primary means of communication is
American Sign Language.39 He has not mastered the English language

37
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of
“Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (noting “a strong
consensus . . . emerging among experts that the ADA’s [Title III] public accommodations
title is underenforced”); Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (analyzing research regarding ADA Title I claims).
38
513 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2008).
39
Id. at 364.
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and communicates with his wife and children in ASL.40 From March
2000 to January 2003, Lockhart worked as a package handler at an
airport facility of Federal Express.41 When he initially applied for the
position, FedEx refused his request to provide an interpreter for his job
interview. Despite FedEx’s legal obligations under the ADA, Lockhart
supplied his own interpreter (a friend) for both the interview and a
subsequent multiday orientation session “because he ‘really wanted the
job,’ and because he ‘felt as if [he] had no other choice.’”42
Although Lockhart did not need an interpreter to perform his
essential job duties as a package handler sorting and processing mail, he
requested an interpreter on numerous occasions for FedEx’s mandatory
employee trainings and meetings concerning “essential topics for its
employees, such as workplace safety, job training, and employee
benefits.”43 FedEx categorically refused his requests. As a result,
Lockhart missed the information conveyed in employee meetings and
was on some occasions not even informed about their occurrence.44
Lockhart’s inability to participate in employee meetings became
particularly unsettling after September 11, 2001, when he missed
receiving “vast amount[s] of information” about safety protocols because
of FedEx’s continuing denial of interpreter services.45 A jury concluded
that FedEx discriminated against Lockhart, awarding both compensatory
and punitive damages which were subsequently upheld on appeal.46
2.

Mosier v. Commonwealth of Kentucky47

Teri Mosier is a deaf attorney admitted to the Kentucky bar.48
Without auxiliary aids and services such as sign language interpreters,
she cannot understand court proceedings. The Kentucky Court of Justice
had a policy of providing sign language interpreters to ensure effective
communication with litigants, jurors, and witnesses, but not with
attorneys.49 When Mosier requested sign language interpreters for her

Id.
Id.
42
Id. at 365 (alteration in original).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 366.
45
Id. at 367.
46
Id.
47
Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier II), 675 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2009). Author Michael
Steven Stein was co-counsel on this case.
48
Id. at 694.
49
Id. at 698.
40
41
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court appearances as a solo practitioner, the Kentucky Court of Justice
refused her request.50
In 2008, Mosier filed a lawsuit against several state defendants
alleging that the Kentucky Court of Justice violated Title II in refusing to
provide auxiliary aids and services to ensure effective communication
with her during her court appearances as an attorney.51 The state
defendants asserted undue burden as an affirmative defense.52 They
further argued in part that Mosier’s employer (she was self-employed at
the time), and not the Kentucky Court of Justice, was the entity
responsible for providing sign language interpreters for Mosier’s court
appearances. The court rejected this argument, ruling that Title II
applied to “all services, programs and activities made available by public
entities.”53 The parties eventually settled, with the Kentucky Court of
Justice agreeing to provide auxiliary aids and services when necessary to
ensure effective communication with deaf attorneys.
3.

Mayberry v. Von Valtier

Dr. Cheryl Von Valtier was the primary care physician for Shirley
Mayberry, a deaf individual. During physical examinations, they
communicated through writing or by using a “signor,” who was often
one of Mayberry’s children.54
On three occasions, however, an agency provided sign language
interpreters. Once, when an interpreter was present, Dr. Von Valtier
realized that an earlier diagnosis had probably been incorrect and wrote
in the chart that to the misdiagnosis likely resulted from “poor
communication.”55 On two of the three occasions that an interpreter was
present, Dr. Von Valtier did not have to pay for the interpreters. On the
third occasion, the interpreter submitted a bill for $28. Dr. Von Valtier
paid the bill and sent the following letter to the interpreter:
Enclosed is payment for your services to Shirley
Mayberry in this office 12/18/92.
The Medicare
payment for Mrs. Mayberry’s office visit has been
received, and I would now like to explain why I won’t
Id. at 695.
Id. at 697. Mosier also asserted a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a
predecessor to the ADA applicable to government entities and generally analyzed
identically with the ADA. See, e.g., Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., 523 F.3d 864,
868 (8th Cir. 2008).
52
Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier I), 640 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
53
Id. at 878–79 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (1999)).
54
Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
55
Id.
50
51
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be able to utilize your services in the future, or indeed
why I really can’t afford to take care of Mrs. Mayberry at
all.
My regular fee for a 15 minute office visit is $40.00. I
spent about 45 minutes with Mrs. Mayberry on
December 12, 1992, for this I was paid $37.17 by
Medicare and (hopefully) $9.29 by Mrs. Mayberry. My
office overhead expense rate is a rather steady 70% of
my gross receipts, which means that for that 45 minutes
I was able to “pocket” $13.94, that is, until I paid your
bill for $28.00.
I certainly hope that the Federal Government does
not further slash this outrageous profit margin.56
Subsequently, Mayberry brought suit and sought an injunction
requiring Dr. Von Valtier to continue to treat her and to pay for an
interpreter for medical appointments. Mayberry further requested that
the court order Dr. Von Valtier “to promulgate policies and procedures
for providing interpreters to ensure effective communication” with deaf
patients and notify them of their right to auxiliary aids and services.57
The court denied the doctor’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that there was “ample evidence to establish an issue of fact
whether defendant intended to discriminate against plaintiff and
withhold future accommodation, or was merely protesting her duty to
accommodate handicapped patients.”58
4.

Lessons

Mayberry is notable for Dr. Von Valtier’s frank admission that she
performed a cost-benefit analysis and concluded that it did not make
financial sense for her to continue to use interpreter services. Similarly,
in Mosier, the Kentucky Court of Justice asserted the defense of undue
burden and further tried to shift to her employer the obligation to pay
for interpreters (even though Mosier was self-employed at the time). In
Lockhart, the company apparently did not see the value of
communicating effectively with one of its package handlers as
outweighing the cost of retaining occasional interpreter services to
communicate with him.

56
57
58
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As these cases show, both larger entities (i.e., FedEx and the
Kentucky Court of Justice) and smaller entities (Dr. Von Valtier’s office)
are reluctant to provide auxiliary aids and services despite legal
obligations to do so for the simple reason that it requires them to incur
expenses. They hesitated to pay for interpreters even though the
requests for interpreter services generally tended to be intermittent—for
meetings, trainings, interviews, and court appearances, for example—as
opposed to regular requests for daily services. In other words, far from
imposing an undue burden, requests for interpreter services generally
impose a cost that is de minimis when compared to a covered entity’s
available financial resources. Nonetheless, entities routinely refuse to
ensure effective communication when providing auxiliary aids and
services seems economically irrational.
As the foregoing shows, many deaf people encounter a glass ceiling
at work or are otherwise unable to benefit fully and equally from
services in the public or private sector because covered entities refuse to
pay for interpreters or other accommodations, no matter how minor, that
might cut into the employers’ profit margin.59 In Part III, we discuss
some of the theoretical underpinnings of the ADA to explain why Titles I
through III are established in a way that perpetuates these economic
disincentives, before examining in Part IV how Title IV removes the
disincentives without deviating from the antidiscrimination principles
animating the law.
III. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: AN IMPERFECT INHERITANCE FROM
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
The problems hindering compliance with Titles I through III are in
many ways rooted in two important principles underlying the economic
structure of those provisions: (1) the social model of disability, and (2)
the
understanding
of
antidiscrimination
as
encompassing
accommodations. These ideas have resulted in a legal regime that places
the cost of communication access on the individual entity that
encounters the deaf person, rather than, for example, on the deaf person
herself or on society at large. However, as we explained in Part II,
individual entities are eager to avoid any expenditure for
accommodations and the result has been rampant noncompliance. The
economic disincentives to comply with the ADA are compounded by

59
See, e.g., EEOC v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 620 F.3d 1103, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010)
(interpreter requested for occasional meetings and required computer training); Downing
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (interpreter
requested for hearing test related to Department of Transportation driving certification).
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enforcement problems, notably Title III’s prohibition on demands for
damages. What is missing in the funding structure of Titles I through III
is the key feature of Title IV: compulsory shared responsibility for the
cost of ADA compliance among an industry or economic sector.
A. The Social Model of Disability and Universal Design
In her anthropological study of a community on Martha’s Vineyard
from the eighteenth through early twentieth centuries, Nora Groce
explains how a disproportionately high rate of hereditary deafness lead
most of the hearing population to learn a form of sign language.60
According to the hearing islanders Groce interviewed,61 the deaf
islanders were fully included in island society; sign language was so
commonplace that hearing islanders sometimes used it to communicate
with each other even when no deaf people were present. 62 In that
context, deafness was not a “disabling” condition.
The principle derived from Groce’s study, as well as the work of
other scholars,63 is that “disability” is a product of environmental
conditions rather than inherent characteristics of the “disabled” person.
This “social model of disability” is a basic tenet of disability rights. As
Tom Shakespeare has discussed, “[w]hile the problems of disabled
people have been explained historically in terms of divine punishment
[and] karma or moral failing, . . . the disability [rights] movement has
focused attention onto social oppression, cultural discourse, and
environmental barriers.”64 The social model’s policy objectives “point[]
away from medical treatment and charity and toward civil rights.”65
In the context of deafness, the disability arises when a hearing
person cannot communicate in sign language and the deaf person with
whom she wants to communicate cannot speak clearly or understand
what the other person is saying. If our society were like the community
in Martha’s Vineyard discussed in Groce’s study and everyone knew
NORA ELLEN GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE: HEREDITARY DEAFNESS
(1985).
61
Id. at 6. No deaf islanders were alive when Groce conducted her research, so she
relied on elderly hearing islanders’ recollections and documentary evidence. Id.
62
Id. at 63–67.
63
See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 111 (1990) (describing the
“social-relations approach” to difference, which seeks to avoid “locat[ing] the problem in
the person who does not fit in rather than in relationships between people and social
institutions”).
64
Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 197
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2006) (discussing the history of the social model).
65
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 20 (2009).
60

ON MARTHA’S VINEYARD
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sign language, there would no longer be any communication barriers to
disable deaf people. This ideal would comport with the principles of
universal design. Universal design is the elimination of a distinction
between a utility and its “accessibility features.” Universally designed
objects or systems accommodate, and ultimately benefit, everyone.66
For example, curb cuts on sidewalks, crucial for wheelchair users,
have benefited people pushing baby strollers and many others, and are
often cited as a paradigmatic example of universal design. Similarly, the
laws requiring that television programming has closed captioning,67
enabling deaf people to access any program, have benefited many
hearing people. Closed captioning is now routinely turned on in
restaurants, gyms, and other public places not wishing to project the
sound. With curb cuts and television captioning, accessibility is built
into the social fabric and can be used at any time by anyone.
Universal design in the context of everyday, variable interactions
between people (as opposed to television programming that can be
captioned a single time and then displayed in accessible format
indefinite times) poses a great challenge; our society, after all, is not
Martha’s Vineyard in the nineteenth century. Most Americans do not
know ASL and the ADA does not require anyone to learn it. Instead, the
law requires covered entities to provide auxiliary aids and services when
necessary to ensure effective communication with deaf people. The law
does not compel the deaf person to pay for auxiliary aids and services.68
Such a requirement would run contrary to the social model’s
understanding of disability as the product of a disabling environment.
Instead, the ADA places responsibility on covered entities to ensure that
they do not create or perpetuate the disabling environment. However,
as we have seen, many covered entities choose to evade their legal
responsibilities when it requires them to incur even minimal costs.
This discrimination is economically “rational” only from the
perspective of the covered entity. From a social perspective, such
discrimination entails costs in the form of barriers that exclude deaf

66
See M. David Lepofsky & Randal N.M. Graham, Universal Design in Legislation:
Eliminating Barriers for People with Disabilities, 30 STATUTE L. REV. 97, 98 (2009) (“The basic
premises of Universal Design are (i) that persons with disabilities ought to have
meaningful access to the same products, buildings, and facilities as everyone else and (ii)
that enhanced accessibility benefits everyone.”); see also Douglas K. Rush & Suzanne J.
Schmitz, Universal Instructional Design: Engaging the Whole Class, 19 WIDENER L.J. 183, 187–
88 (2009) (detailing principles of universal design and arguing for the integration of
universal design into law school instruction).
67
See 47 C.F.R. § 79.1 (2010).
68
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2010) (prohibiting surcharges by Title II entities); id.
§ 36.301(c) (same prohibition on Title III entities).
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people and result in lost productivity. As we have seen with television
captioning and curb cuts, universal design benefits not just people with
disabilities but everyone. When auxiliary aids and services such as
interpreters and real-time captioning are integrated into the social fabric,
hearing people and deaf people are able to communicate more
efficiently, resulting in productivity gains.
B. Accommodation as Antidiscrimination
In order to imagine a more economically efficient ADA which results
in the greater inclusion of deaf people in society, we explore the ADA’s
roots as an antidiscrimination law borrowing heavily from prior statutes
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, race, and religion, most
pertinently the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Traditional antidiscrimination
law would clearly prohibit the dentist in our example from refusing to
serve women patients because they are women, or Muslim patients
because they are Muslim.69 Such discrimination is based on prejudice
and animus and is economically irrational—the dentist is losing out on
the prospective patients’ business. Likewise, the ADA prohibits the
dentist from refusing to treat a patient because he is deaf.70 The ADA
therefore treats people with disabilities as a minority group akin to a
historically disadvantaged racial, ethnic, or religious group.71
This approach reflects a long-standing demand among disability
rights advocates for equality through civil rights rather than charitable

69
See, e.g., Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(articulating that “the fact that the Hasidic clientele strongly prefer male [bus] drivers does
not [justify discrimination]”); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 n.25 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (“If an employer could justify employment discrimination merely on the
grounds that it is necessary to make a profit, Title VII would be nullified in short order”);
Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. Rev.
1335, 1373 (1997) (“If customers feel uncomfortable doing business with female executives
or being served by male flight attendants, that’s the customers’ problem”). Outside the
employment context, see, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–22 (1984) (finding
exclusion of women from the Jaycees actionable discrimination); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding constitutionality of public
accommodations part of Civil Rights Act in context of hotel refusing to rent rooms to
African-Americans); United States v. Gulf-State Theaters, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 549, 552 (N.D.
Miss. 1966) (rejecting theater’s defense that white patrons objected to presence of AfricanAmerican patrons).
70
See, e.g., Sumes v. Andres, 938 F. Supp. 9, 11–12 (D.D.C. 1996) (granting summary
judgment against doctor who refused to treat deaf patient because he believed “all deaf
people are high risk” but had not made any inquiry into patient’s condition).
71
BAGENSTOS, supra note 65, at 21–22. As Bagenstos has explained, advocates for
disability rights have not uniformly embraced this view of disability; some adopt a more
universal view of disability.
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laws.72 Beginning in the 1970s, disability rights advocates began to argue
that social welfare provisions intended to assist them also impugned
their autonomy and hindered their participation as full citizens.73 In
many ways, the ADA represents the fruits of these efforts. The Civil
Rights Act addresses racism not by offering subsidies to employers and
other entities which would otherwise exclude historically disadvantaged
racial groups, but by penalizing those entities which engage in such
exclusion and thus perpetuate subjugation and inequality. Likewise, the
ADA is a fault-based regime that imposes upon entities encountering
deaf people the responsibility to eliminate communication barriers that
the law views as resulting from the entity’s own conduct.74
Despite this similarity in approach, it has been contended that the
Civil Rights Act and the ADA differ in that the former prohibits
discrimination based on animus while the latter also prohibits
economically rational discrimination.75 For instance, the dentist’s denial
of interpreter services likely stemmed not from any dislike of deaf
people generally, but rather from her simple cost-benefit analysis. The
discrimination banned by traditional antidiscrimination law, it has
therefore been argued, is economically irrational, while the ADA also
proscribes economically rational discrimination. Based on these and
other distinctions, numerous scholars and even judges have urged that
the ADA’s accommodation mandate is fundamentally different than
more traditional antidiscrimination law.76
Many scholars, however, have explained how the distinctions
between antidiscrimination and accommodation are overblown.77
Traditional civil rights statutes, after all, also prohibit conduct that
results in a disparate impact on individuals in a protected class, even
when there is no stereotyping or discriminatory animus present.
Christine Jolls offers as an illustration a grooming policy, adopted by a
Domino’s pizza franchise, which prohibited male employees from
See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993).
73
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (2004).
74
BAGENSTOS, supra note 65, at 69.
75
Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 880 (2001).
76
Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the
Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575, 605 (2002); Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 3
(1996); see also Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Title I of the
ADA . . . requires employers to consider and to accommodate disabilities, and in the
process extends beyond the anti-discrimination principle.”).
77
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001);
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004).
72
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wearing beards.78 Because a certain skin condition makes it difficult or
impossible for a significant number of black men to shave, but has no
such effect on white men, the Eighth Circuit struck down the franchise’s
rule as having an impermissible disparate impact on African-American
men.79 The court concluded that the franchise could not establish a
business necessity for the rule, exempting it from liability, “even though
it had acted in response to perceived customer concerns about bearded
employees.”80 Likewise, job selection criteria, such as certain physical
requirements for a police officer position, may be discriminatory if it
disproportionately and negatively impacts female applicants and is not
justified by business necessity.81 Indeed, some courts have explicitly
recognized that disparate impact law can impose costs on employers.82
As these examples illustrate, in addition to banning decisions based
on prejudice and animus towards a group, traditional antidiscrimination
law also prohibits economically rational discrimination. Employers may
not “engag[e] in intentional race or sex discrimination even when a
rational, nonbigoted, purely bottom-line-oriented employer would
engage in that conduct.”83 An employer cannot decline to hire a person
because, even though the employer is not prejudiced, it anticipates that
customers’ preference for having a person of a particular sex in the job
will hamper business.84 Title VII does allow employers to make
decisions based on an individual’s religion, sex, or national origin when
such a quality “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.”85 This, however, is an “extremely narrow exception.”86
Notably, it does not include decisions based on race.87
The ADA likewise prohibits discrimination based on economically
rational discrimination, which we have observed in our practice to be the
Jolls, supra note 77, at 653.
Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 796–99 (8th Cir. 1993).
80
Jolls, supra note 77, at 654.
81
Id.
82
See, e.g., EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (“It is true
that antidiscrimination statutes impose costs on employers. That is obvious in disparateimpact cases, when the employer is told to change a policy that may not have been adopted
for discriminatory reasons (though that is its effect) and so presumably is efficient.”).
83
BAGENSTOS, supra note 65, at 67.
84
See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v.
Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
85
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
86
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see also, e.g., supra note 69 (noting
justifications for discrimination that the Bollenbach and Wilson courts did not accept).
87
See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) (“It is . . . not
irrational, but it is clearly forbidden by Title VII, to refuse on racial grounds to hire
someone because your customers or clientele do not like his race.”).
78
79
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increasingly dominant form of discrimination against deaf people.88
While deaf people are without doubt severely hindered by hearing
people’s prejudices towards them, more often discrimination takes the
form of a covered entity simply not wanting to pay for the cost of
ensuring effective communication.
Despite the broad similarities between traditional antidiscrimination
law and the ADA in prohibiting discrimination that is both economically
irrational and rational, however, we discern an important distinction.
Accommodations made pursuant to traditional antidiscrimination laws
are often difficult to quantify: how can an employer measure the cost of
hiring a man despite the preference of its customers to see a woman in
the job? As one district court concluded, “an employer’s mere
‘beforehand belief’ that sex discrimination is a financial imperative”
cannot by itself justify sex-based hiring criteria.89
In the context of rational discrimination, therefore, traditional
antidiscrimination law generally requires the employer or public
accommodation to absorb a potential (and sometimes illusory) future loss. By
contrast, ADA accommodations can involve actual capital expenditures
which can be calculated in advance. Many accommodations required by the
ADA are readily quantifiable and easy to measure against the profit
generated by a customer or worker with a disability.90 The dentist, for
example, was able to ascertain in real financial terms that the cost of
interpreter services for the deaf man’s visit would exceed her office’s net
profit from his visit. Indeed, it would be a rare interpreter who would
agree to perform a job without first clarifying her hourly rate and
mandatory minimum payment.
In addition, in the specific context of accessibility for deaf people, the
steps necessary to ensure access often do not facilitate the kinds of cost
efficiencies that sometimes occur in addressing other types of barriers for
people with disabilities.91 Accessibility features such as ramps and
See BAGENSTOS, supra note 65, at 65.
Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
90
See, e.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying motion to
dismiss complaint by employee whose disability made it impossible to take public
transportation to work and who requested that her employer pay for a parking space in the
vicinity, even though the space cost “$300–$520 a month, representing 15–26 percent of her
monthly net salary”).
91
A further obstacle to cost efficiency is the fact that deaf people do not have uniform
means of communication. Some deaf people use sign language as their primary means of
communication. Other deaf people do not know sign language and instead rely on
lipreading or captioning to receive information. The auxiliary aids and services necessary
to ensure effective communication with a deaf individual in a specific situation may not
result in effective communication with the same individual in another situation. The
classic example is that writing notes may result in effective communication when placing a
88
89
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elevators, installed during construction or following litigation, often
result in permanent, increased building accessibility.92 Similarly, as
noted earlier, captioning television programming is a one-time
expenditure; once a program is captioned, the captions can be displayed
an infinite number of times to an infinite number of people for no
additional charge.93 By contrast, the cost of auxiliary aids and services
for deaf people to ensure effective communication between two or more
individuals in real time is an expense that must be borne each time
communication takes place.
Although many covered entities may initially be willing to bear such
expenses, or to bear them to a limited extent, they may refuse to provide
auxiliary aids and services once they realize that the expenditures are
potentially endless and may place them at a competitive disadvantage.
Howard Rosenblum’s experience with the Midwest Center on Law and
the Deaf offers a telling illustration. Rosenblum, a deaf attorney, cofounded an attorney referral center for deaf people who could not
otherwise find counsel despite having meritorious cases.94 The Center’s
staff initially struggled to find attorneys willing to represent deaf people
because of the cost of communication access. Those whom they
eventually recruited were initially appreciative of the new business but
became disenchanted when they realized that they were bearing the cost
of communication access “for the whole legal profession.”95 These
lawyers did not want to be at a competitive disadvantage relative to their
peers who eschew their legal obligation to ensure effective
communication for deaf clients.

restaurant order but not when attending a university lecture. Covered entities may be
required to undertake an interactive process with the deaf person in order to learn which
auxiliary aids and services, if any, are necessary to communicate effectively with that
person. As a result, entities often cannot fully anticipate their legal obligations in a specific
situation until they have encountered the deaf person or received an advance request for
auxiliary aids and services.
92
See, e.g., Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 893–94 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that to
avoid “piecemeal compliance,” a blind patron who had only experienced poor signage in
single restroom nonetheless had standing to sue for building-wide ADA violations
affecting blind individuals).
93
The debate regarding the cost of captioning in movie theaters has centered on the cost
of installation, not on ongoing costs. See, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins
Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing a case in which
plaintiffs sought captioning in movie theatres). See also John Waldo, The ADA and Movie
Captioning: A Long and Winding Road to an Obvious Destination, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1033
(2011) (presenting a discussion of the use of captioning at movie theaters).
94
See generally Howard A. Rosenblum, Communication Access Funds: Achieving the
Unrealized Aims of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061 (2011).
95
Id. at 1072.
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In short, the ADA reflects a historical move of disability rights
activists “From Good Will to Civil Rights,”96 but its antidiscrimination
mandate fits imperfectly in the context of disability discrimination. The
distinctions between traditional antidiscrimination law and Titles I
through III suggest that economically rational discrimination is a much
more potent and pervasive force in the context of ADA compliance than
in other civil rights areas. The ADA may be quite similar, normatively,
to other antidiscrimination laws, but we have no doubt that its
accommodation mandate is perceived as an unfair economic burden by
covered entities because it requires out of pocket expenditures which are
more readily quantified in advance and which often must be incurred on
an ongoing basis. Increasing ADA compliance—and, ultimately, the
greater inclusion of people with disabilities in our society—will require
solutions that acknowledge and directly address the economic
disincentives presented by the law’s accommodation mandate.
C. Making Matters Worse, the ADA is Underenforced
Against the economic reasons not to comply with the ADA discussed
above, the ADA offers the threat of liability as a reason to comply with
the ADA. Potential liability, however, can only provide an economic
incentive to comply with the ADA if litigation is a real possibility.
However, the law is broadly underenforced.
Title III in particular has suffered from enforcement problems
because it does not provide for damages.97 Only injunctive relief is
available.98 This statutory limitation hinders enforcement in several
crucial ways. Because the resources of nonprofit and governmental
enforcement agencies are severely limited, ADA enforcement depends
on the willingness of practitioners in the private bar to represent deaf
people who have experienced discrimination.99 However, in Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human
Resources, the Supreme Court barred the recovery of statutory fees absent
a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties”
RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY (2d ed. 2001).
97
See RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 166 (2005) (describing the unavailability of damages under Title III
as its primary impediment to enforcement).
98
28 C.F.R. § 36.504 (2010). Civil penalties are recoverable only in Title III enforcement
actions commenced by the Attorney General. Id.
99
See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 447
(2007) (noting that “the ADA is heavily dependent on private enforcement” but that those
efforts are hindered by various impediments and arguing for more robust enforcement by
governmental entities).
96
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such as a consent decree.100 At any time after a Title III lawsuit has been
filed, a defendant might moot the case and undermine the plaintiff’s
ability to recover attorney fees, by making the change the plaintiff
sought.101 The result is that Title III entities often can evade liability by
immediately modifying discriminatory policies after the lawsuit is filed
and then moving to dismiss the case as moot.102 While of course
redressing a discriminatory policy is ultimately good for deaf people,
Buckhannon has severely limited incentives for attorneys in the private
bar to pursue ADA Title III cases, an effect that has hindered deaf
people’s ability to enforce their right to effective communication.
Moreover, private attorneys themselves are subject to Title III and
beset with the same considerations of economically rational
discrimination hindering compliance outside legal offices. They, too,
discriminate against deaf people. Many deaf people who would like to
bring discrimination claims based on the failure to ensure effective
communication under Titles I through III cannot find an attorney who
will remove the communication barriers necessary to facilitate proper
representation.103
100
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). Moreover, when attorneys do obtain the award of attorneys’
fees, they are able to recover only the lodestar, which is the amount of hours worked
multiplied by a rate commensurate with prevailing market rates paid to attorneys
representing fee paying clients, without any enhancement to compensate for the high risk
of civil rights litigation. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992); Bagenstos,
Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies, supra note 37, at 1011. The result is that
attorneys working on a contingency basis will inevitably earn an effective hourly rate lower
than their colleagues with fee-paying clients. Id. Without the prospect of recovering a
contingent amount of the plaintiff’s damages, attorneys are even less economically
incentivized to represent ADA plaintiffs than they are other kinds of civil rights plaintiffs.
101
See Tressler v. Pyramid Healthcare, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518–19 (W.D. Pa. 2006)
(claiming mootness and attorney fees unavailable where addiction facility initially declined
to admit blind patient but ultimately did provide treatment). Assertions of mootness due
to remediation, however, are susceptible to challenges that the remedial actions are
insincere, temporary, or incomplete. See, e.g., Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505
F.3d 1173, 118489 (11th Cir. 2007) (claims of blind mother prohibited from accompanying
son to examination room with her service animal not moot despite clinic’s adoption of
service animal policy).
102
To establish standing to bring a claim for prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff must
show not only that she has been injured in the past but also that she is at risk of suffering a
similar injury in the future. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992);
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see also Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto
Ctr., LLC, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing factors a court may consider in
determining the likelihood an ADA Title III plaintiff will return to a noncompliant
business). But see Clark v. McDonald’s Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 227 (D.N.J. 2003).
103
See, e.g., Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and Joseph
David Camacho, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Dep’t of Just. No. 202-4937 (2007), http://www.ada.gov/albuquerue.htm. The Justice
Department has sued several law offices for refusing to ensure effective communication
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Even without the barriers that make it difficult for deaf ADA
plaintiffs to find attorneys willing to represent them, litigation is a slow
and high-risk means of dispute resolution. The priority of the deaf man
denied interpreter services from the dentist is probably finding another
dentist, not vindicating his rights. Once he finds a dentist willing to
ensure effective communication through the provision of interpreter
services, he may lose motivation to sue the discriminatory dentist, who is
then emboldened to refuse future requests for interpreter services by
other deaf clients.
We do not suggest that the dentist, let alone every other
noncompliant entity, knows about the myriad hindrances plaguing ADA
enforcement when they decide not to make themselves accessible to deaf
people. We do suggest that rampant noncompliance is self-perpetuating.
The dentist probably did not know of many other businesses that had
been successfully sued by ADA plaintiffs. To the contrary, she may have
observed that her competitors were also choosing noncompliance. The
threat of litigation does not provide a sufficiently strong incentive to
comply with the law when not complying seems economically rational in
the short term.
D. What to Do?
In response to these well-documented problems, commentators have
generally proposed reforms which would increase incentives to litigate,
in the belief that more litigation will result in greater enforcement.104 We
do not disagree with this basic proposition. We believe, however, that
even with more litigation, enforcement problems will persist because the
threat of future litigation does not always outweigh the perceived
immediate burden of incurring expenses to provide auxiliary aids and
services to ensure equal access for deaf people. Moreover, litigation is a
costly process that must be initiated each time that discrimination occurs;
because it is not possible to sue every discriminatory entity, some
portion of those who choose noncompliance will inevitably “win” the
gamble in choosing noncompliance.
We believe that the path to greater compliance lies not in
encouraging more lawsuits but in removing the economic disincentives
to comply with the ADA. If individual entities no longer had to consider
cost when determining whether to provide auxiliary aids and services
because they had already paid in advance along with their competitors,
with deaf clients. Id.; see also Elana Nightingale Dawson, Lawyers’ Responsibilities Under Title
III of the ADA: Ensuring Communication Access for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, 45 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1143 (2011); Rosenblum, supra note 94.
104
Bagenstos, Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies, supra note 37.
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these disincentives would disappear.
In fact, it would become
economically irrational to discriminate as entities would no longer want
to turn away deaf people who are productive workers or paying clients.
Moreover, they would want to utilize the services for which they had
already paid. Paying for communication access in advance and in
concert with competitors is precisely what Title IV demands of the
telecommunications industry, and what we suggest all other entities
should be required to do as well.
IV. TITLE IV: DIFFERENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, DIFFERENT RESULT
We now turn our attention to Title IV, which has succeeded where
Titles I through III have failed in aligning economic incentives to ensure
that deaf people have full access to communication. Title IV’s relay
services mandate has worked by spreading the cost of communication
access equitably among all common carriers.
A. The History of Relay Services
Until the late 1990s, devices called TTYs were the predominant
TTYs are
means for deaf people to make telephone calls.105
teletypewriters, which work by sending coded signals over telephone
lines to other TTYs which translate the signals into text for the receiving
party to read.106 Individuals with TTYs can communicate with one
another over telephone lines by placing telephone receivers on TTYs and
typing messages to one another.
One limitation of TTYs, however, is that both parties to the call are
required to have a TTY. Most hearing people do not have TTYs. An
informal system developed in the late 1960s and 1970s where private
operators with a TTY would “relay” calls between a deaf TTY user and a
hearing telephone user.107 The deaf person would type to the “relay”
person who would read out loud the typed message. The hearing
person would respond verbally for the “relay” person to type back to the
TTY user. These underfunded private efforts could not meet demand
and states started providing this service on a limited but growing scale

S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 78 (1989); KAREN STRAUSS PELTZ, A NEW CIVIL RIGHT:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUALITY FOR DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING AMERICANS 131–32
(2006).
106
47 C.F.R. § 64.601(a)(8) (2010); In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., the ADA of 1990 & the
Telecomms. Act of 1996, 12 FCC Rcd. 1152, 1154 n.15 (1997). Although TTYs are still in
existence, the advent of computers, the internet, and personal device assistants (“PDAs”)
has rendered TTYs largely obsolete.
107
STRAUSS PELTZ, supra note 105, at 56–61.
105
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in the 1970s and 1980s.108 Title IV of the ADA codified this developing
practice by requiring it on a national scale.109
Title IV amended the Communications Act of 1934 by requiring
common carriers to provide telecommunications relay services
(“TRS”).110 The statute defines “telecommunications relay services” as
“telephone transmission services” which permit people with hearing or
speech impairments a means of communicating with hearing people
“functionally equivalent” to how two hearing people communicate over
the telephone.111 Title IV prohibits charging relay users rates greater
than those charged for “functionally equivalent voice communication
services.”112 The FCC, which is charged with implementing Title IV, has
explained that the process of calling the TRS provider to initiate a relay
call is the functional equivalent of reaching a dial tone.113
On July 26, 1991, the one-year anniversary of the ADA’s signing, the
FCC promulgated regulations governing the provision of relay services.
In its order announcing the regulations, which established minimum
standards for providing relay services,114 the FCC stated that
108
Id. at 58–61; see also In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 12 FCC Rcd. at 1152 n.4 (noting that
prior to the enactment of Title IV, “some states offered relay services, but the services
offered differed from state to state, and were subject to many limitations” (citing Strauss,
Title IV—Telecommunications, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 156–
58 (Gostin & Beyer eds. 1993))); In re Access to Telecomms. Equip. and Servs. by the
Hearing Impaired and other Disabled Persons, 3 FCC Rcd. 1982, 1987–88 (1988) (noting that
state relay services were usually limited to intrastate calls).
109
47 U.S.C. § 225 (2006).
110
Id. § 225(c).
111
Id. § 225(a)(3).
112
Id. § 225(d)(1)(D). This law requires the FCC to implement regulations which “require
that users of telecommunications relay services pay rates no greater than the rates paid for
functionally equivalent voice communication services with respect to such factors as the
duration of the call, the time of day, and the distance from point of origination to point of
termination.” Id.
113
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing
& Speech Disabilities, 19 FCC Rcd. 12475, 12534 (2004). The FCC has been explicit in
stating that relay services are the equivalent of telephone services. Id. Additionally,
[i]n enacting Title IV of the ADA, and creating the federally regulated
TRS scheme, Congress intended that persons with hearing and speech
disabilities be provided with a means of communicating with hearing
individuals through a third party—the CA—who relays the
conversation between the parties. To this end, as we have frequently
explained, the TRS scheme is intended to ensure that persons with
hearing and speech disabilities have functionally equivalent access to the
telephone system.
Id.
114
In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities & the ADA
of 1990, 6 FCC Rcd. 4657, 4659 (1991). As part of these mandatory minimums, the FCC
required that TRS providers “operate every day, 24 hours a day.” Id. at 4669.
Communications assistants are “prohibited from disclosing the content of any relayed
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“[c]ompetition among TRS providers to attract customers to the
service . . . should spur providers to achieve the highest quality
service.”115 The FCC referenced this theme to encourage TRS providers
to hire communications assistants with high typing speeds116 and to offer
customers discounted toll rates.117 As the FCC envisioned, the interstate
relay system would depend upon reliable and efficient TRS providers,
ideally competing with each other to offer superior services.
The FCC struggled, however, with the issue of how interstate relay
services should be paid for and did not determine a specific cost
recovery mechanism until February 1993, just months before common
carriers were required to begin providing interstate TRS.118 In this
February 1993 order, the FCC discussed its consideration of two
proposals. One proposal was a shared-funding mechanism that would
require interstate common carriers to pool their resources by
contributing to a fund used to reimburse relay service providers.
Another proposal was a self-funding proposal, which would have
required interstate common carriers to fund their own provisions of
relay services.
This was a critical fork-in-the-road moment for relay services. A
self-funding mechanism would have paralleled Titles I through III,
which require those entities that come into contact with deaf people to
pay for the cost of communicating with them. As we have explained,
many of these covered entities engage in a cost-benefit analysis which
leads them to risk violating the law by not providing auxiliary aids and

conversation regardless of content” or “intentionally altering a relayed conversation and
must relay all conversation verbatim unless the relay user specifically requests
summarization.” Id. at 4668; see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.604 (2010); Germano v. Int’l Profit Ass’n,
544 F.3d 798, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2008).
115
In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 6 FCC Rcd. at
4659.
116
Id. at 4658–59. In 2000, the FCC would require communications assistants to have a
minimum typing speed of sixty words per minute, citing technological improvements. In
re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing &
Speech Disabilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 5140, 5171–72 (2000).
117
In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 6 FCC Rcd. at
4663.
118
Id. at 4664; In re Telecomms. Servs. for Hearing-Impaired & Speech-Impaired
Individuals & the ADA of 1990, 5 FCC Rcd. 7187, 7190–91 (1990). The law breaks down
relay services into interstate relay calls between relay users in different states and intrastate
relay calls between relay users in the same state. Title IV requires the FCC to provide
generally that “costs caused by interstate telecommunications relay services shall be
recovered from all subscribers for every interstate service and costs caused by intrastate
telecommunications relay services shall be recovered from the intrastate jurisdiction.” 47
U.S.C. § 225(d)(3)(B) (2006). The discussion which follows concerns the funding for
interstate relay calls; intrastate relay calls are funded at the state level. Id. § 225(d)(3).
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services such as interpreters. The self-funding mechanism would place
telecommunication companies in a similar position to that of the dentist
whose deaf patient requests interpreter services for his visit.
The FCC, of course, could not know how economic disincentives
would hinder the effectiveness of Titles I through III. Nonetheless, the
FCC anticipated the problem of rational discrimination, noting “that a
self-funding mechanism would provide incentives for carriers to handle
fewer relay calls, to degrade relay calling quality, to migrate relay
customers to other carriers, and to restrict relay to only their
presubscribed customers.”119 Dentists, lawyers, and other entities
covered by Titles I through III engage in equivalent downgrading every
day—they seek the least expensive means of engaging with deaf
employees and consumers instead of the most effective means.
In light of this concern, the FCC selected shared funding as “the best
interstate TRS cost recovery mechanism because it spreads the financial
liability to all subscribers of every interstate service.”120 The FCC
explained that “by compensating TRS providers based on actual relay
minutes, those TRS providers who provide excellent service to the public
and thereby generate strong demand, will benefit.”121 Accordingly, a
shared funding mechanism would “create strong incentives for TRS
providers to offer high quality, innovative service at a reasonable
cost.”122
With these goals in mind, the FCC established an interstate relay
services fund to which all carriers of interstate services are required to
contribute.123 The shared funding mechanism works by estimating the
cost of providing relay services for the following year and dividing that
number by the estimated interstate revenue base to yield a “contribution
factor.” Interexchange carriers determine their contributions to the fund
by multiplying their expected interstate revenues by the contributing
factor.124 In this fashion, each interexchange carrier make contributions
119
In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities & the ADA
of 1990, 8 FCC Rcd. 1802, 1806 (1993) (emphasis added).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & the ADA of 1990, 8 FCC Rcd. 5300, 5303 (1993).
124
The initial contributing factor was 0.00047 for the period July 26, 1993, through April
26, 1994. Id. This figure was the equivalent of a 0.047% tax on interstate revenues. The
contributing factor has fluctuated slightly over the years. For the 2010–11 fund year, the
FCC set the contributory rate at 0.00585, at the equivalent of a 0.0585% tax on end-user
revenues. In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with
Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 25 FCC Rcd. 8689, 8689–90 (2010). In 1999, the FCC adjusted
this revenue collecting scheme to focus on end-user revenues rather than gross interstate
revenues. 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Streamlined Contributor Reporting Requirements
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to the fund based on their market share of interstate revenues, not based
on the extent to which deaf individuals use their company’s services.125
The TRS fund makes payments to relay service providers based on
the number of “minutes of use” of relay services provided and payment
rates which the FCC adjusts on a periodic basis.126 The FCC has
explained that reimbursing providers based on the minutes of relay
services provided “encourage[s] providers to develop efficient and costeffective TRS programs.”127 The TRS administrator periodically adjusts
the reimbursement rate, which varies by the type of relay service
provided.128 Only those providers which comply with the mandatory
minimum standards for the provision of relay services are eligible for
reimbursement.129 Deaf people choose the TRS provider which will
receive reimbursement every time they make a call.

Associated with Administration of Telecommunications Relay Services, North American Numbering
Plan, Local Number Portability, and Universal Services Support Mechanisms, 16 Commc’ns Reg. (P
& F) 688, 1999 WL 492955 (F.C.C.) ¶ 8 (July 14, 1999).
125
At the intrastate level, states recover the cost of the intrastate service contracts from all
ratepayers in the state, whether through an intrastate subscriber line surcharge or through
a general ratemaking process. In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for
Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 5140, 5156 (2000). With
respect to the provision of intrastate relay services, states have generally employed a
competitive bidding process to select a single relay service provider which relay users must
then use to make all intrastate relay calls. In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-toSpeech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 16 FCC Rcd. 4662, 4664–
65 (2001); In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs., 15 FCC Rcd. at 5156; In re
Telecomms. Relay Servs., the ADA of 1990 & the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 12 FCC Rcd.
1152, 1154 n.13 (1997). Some states have employed a multi-vendoring system in which
several vendors compete with each other in providing relay services. In re Telecomms.
Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs., 15 FCC Rcd. at 5158. Although the FCC has stated
that “competitive forces are generally the preferred way to improve service quality and
bring new services to customers” and that “giving consumers a choice among different TRS
providers might well improve the quality of TRS service in different states,” it has stated
that FCC rules do not prohibit single vendor arrangements. Id. at 5157. Nonetheless, the
FCC has “encourage[d] states to consider whether the single- or the multi-vendoring model
best meets their constituents’ particular needs” and “to continue experimenting with ways
to allow competitive forces to improve the quality of TRS service.” Id. at 5157–58.
126
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & the ADA of 1990, 8 FCC Rcd. at 5305.
127
Id.
128
In June 2010, the most recent month for which reimbursement was made, relay
services were reimbursed at between $1.2801 and $6.7025 per minute depending on the
type of relay service provided. See Nat’l Exch. Carrier Ass’n, TRS Monthly Fund Reports,
NECA, https://www.neca.org/cms400min/NECA_Templates/TRSInterior.aspx?id=1253
(click on “August” under 2010) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
129
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & the ADA of 1990, 8 FCC Rcd. at 5305.
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B. A Marketplace for Innovation in Telecommunication Access
The results of the FCC’s funding structure have been spectacular. In
setting up a regime that rewards relay service providers for attracting
relay users, the FCC instantly created a new marketplace for providing
deaf people with equal access to telephone services. New companies
quickly developed to meet this need and competed with one another for
the privilege of providing relay services.
This relay marketplace has resulted in innovations in services,
making telephone services ever more accessible to deaf people.130 When
interstate relay services were first provided, deaf people could only place
relay calls using a TTY. Relay users had the option of choosing between
full TRS, in which the TTY user reads and types the entire conversation,
and partial TRS, in which the TTY user has the option to voice or listen
for himself.131
In the years that have followed Title IV and the advent of
compulsory TRS funding, relay service providers have competed to offer
new forms of relay services.132 The direct descendant of TTY relay
services is internet protocol (“IP”) relay. Through IP relay, deaf people
may use computers or personal device assistants such as a Blackberry or
iPhone to place or receive text relay calls.133 Another new form of relay
that has become popular with deaf people is captioned telephone relay.
In this form of relay, the relay operator does not type what the hearing
person is saying. Rather, the relay operator uses voice-recognition
software which has been trained to recognize the relay operator’s voice.
The relay operator re-voices what the hearing person says and the words

130
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing
& Speech Disabilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 20577, 20580–81 (2005).
131
When a relay user chooses “voice carry over” (“VCO”), the relay user speaks for
himself and then the relay operator types the hearing caller’s response. When a relay user
uses “hearing carry over” (“HCO”), the relay user (typically a hearing person with a speech
impairment) types his words and listens to the hearing caller’s response. In re Telecomms.
Relay Servs., the ADA of 1990 & the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 12 FCC Rcd. 1152, 1155 (1997)
(describing VCO and HCO); In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing and
Speech Disabilities & the ADA of 1990, 6 FCC Rcd. 4657, 4658 (1991) (requiring VCO and
HCO when the first regulations were promulgated).
132
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 12 FCC Rcd. at 1157 (“Since the implementation of TRS in
July 1993, many TRS providers have, on their own initiative, sought to develop innovative
forms of TRS by offering services and features not required under the Commission’s
current rules.”).
133
In re Provision of Improved Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for
Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 7779, 7781–83 (2002). Both
intrastate and interstate IP calls are reimbursed by the interstate fund. Id. at 7786.
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come up on the deaf caller’s end, whether through a computer, personal
device assistant, or a specially ordered phone.134
In addition to making telephone calls using text-based relay, deaf
people can also now place video relay calls using sign language. In the
late 1990s, the first trials were conducted for video relay services
(“VRS”), which allow a deaf person to use a sign language interpreter to
make telephone calls.135 In this form of relay, the deaf person and the
interpreter each have a videophone which permits them to see each other
and use sign language to communicate with each other. This service
proved popular among deaf people who were able to make telephone
calls in real-time using their native language.136 In 2000, the FCC stated
that it would permit reimbursement for relay service providers which
chose to offer this service.137 Subsequently, competition among relay
service providers has been so intense that companies have provided deaf
people with free videophones to encourage them to use their services.138
Relay service providers also now provide services in languages other
than English. TRS providers must provide text-based relay services in
Spanish and have the option to do so in other languages as well.139 Relay
service providers may also receive reimbursement for providing VRS
between ASL users and Spanish speakers.140 At least one relay service

134
See In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with
Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 18 FCC Rcd. 16121, 1612223 (2003).
135
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 12 FCC Rcd. at 1158.
136
STRAUSS PELTZ, supra note 105, at 132–35. Text-based relay calls are much slower for
relay service providers to process because communications assistants cannot type as fast as
people can talk. In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 12 FCC Rcd. at 1158.
137
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing
& Speech Disabilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 5140, 5152 (2000). The FCC has ruled that the interstate
TRS fund may be used to fund intrastate VRS calls, explaining that this reimbursement
scheme would permit it “to asses[s] demand and let market forces determine the
technologies of choice for delivery of [VRS], while not depriving any consumer who is
willing to invest in new technologies the ability to make any call, not just an interstate call.”
Id. at 5154.
138
The FCC does not reimburse VRS providers for the cost of providing videophones.
See, e.g., In re Structure & Practices of the Video Relay Serv. Program, 25 FCC Rcd. 8597,
8614 (June 28, 2010). Some VRS providers sell videophones, while others provide
videophones free of charge to encourage relay users to use their services. See, e.g.,
SORENSONVRS.COM, http://www.sorensonvrs.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (prominently
advertising a free videophone for deaf and hard of hearing people who use sign language).
139
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 15 FCC Rcd. at 5154–55.
140
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing
& Speech Disabilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 13140, 13149–55 (2005).
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provider even offers the option to place VRS calls using interpreters who
can translate to and from virtually any widely spoken language.141
Finally, relay service providers must now offer speech-to-speech
relay services. This form of relay service uses specially trained
communications assistants who can understand the speech patterns of
relay users and repeat their words clearly to the hearing caller.142 This
form of relay benefits users who may have difficulty typing or signing
due to a physical disability.143
This dizzying array of innovative relay services today provides deaf
people with multiple options for placing and receiving relay calls as
often as they would like at any time of the day for little or no cost. The
use of relay services has grown exponentially over the years as deaf
people have had more options to choose from and have begun to take for
granted that they can make telephone calls with the same ease as hearing
people. In December 2010, the most recent month for which data is
available, TRS relay totaled 14,813,870 reimbursable minutes, or more
than twenty-eight years’ worth of relay calls in a single month. Of this
total, VRS relay totaled 8,199,535 reimbursable minutes or more than
fifteen years’ worth of relay calls in a single month.144
This extraordinary growth in relay services has occurred even
though relay services come with their own set of issues for users. We
have observed that text-based relay is painfully slow for relay users who
must slow down their conversations; communications assistants typing
verbatim what they hear cannot keep up with the rapid pace of speech.
VRS confines the three-dimensional language of ASL to a two-dimension
screen, and ASL can lose some of its meaning and clarity in the process.
Moreover, the quality of the video is only as good as the internet
connection; when the connection is poor, it can be difficult, if not
impossible, for sign language users to see and understand each other
Interpreters not physically present also have fewer
clearly.145
opportunities to prepare in advance for the discussion and for the deaf
individual’s signing method. They cannot read the full body language of
the conversants. VRS also assigns interpreters at random; deaf people
141
This service works by pairing the communications assistant with a language line. The
relay service provider pays for the language line as a competitive feature. See
LIFELINKS.NET, http://www.lifelinks.net/index.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
142
In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 15 FCC Rcd. at 5149–50.
143
Id.
144
TRS Fund Performance Status Report: Funding Year July 2010–June 2011, NAT’L EXCH.
CARRIER ASS’N (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.neca.org/cms400min/NECA_Templates/
TRSInterior.aspx?id=1253 (click on “December” under 2010).
145
See Position Statement: VRI Services in Hospitals, NAT’L ASS’N DEAF (Apr. 2008),
http://www.nad.org/issues/technology/vri/position-statement-hospitals.
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can, however, channel through interpreters until they find an interpreter
who they like.
There is one additional important limitation to Title IV, which we
discuss in the remainder of this Article. From its conception, TRS has
been conceived of as the functional equivalent of telephone services.
Since hearing people do not ordinarily use the telephone to communicate
with each other when they are in the same room, the FCC has ruled that
relay calls between two people in the same room are not reimbursable.146
Although the regulatory scheme does not prohibit relay service providers
from providing relay services when the callers are in the same room,
they will not receive reimbursement for such services. Therefore, most
relay service providers generally will not accept such calls for processing
(although it is our understanding that some VRS providers have a policy
of interpreting communications between two people in the same room in
emergency circumstances). As a result, the deaf person and the hearing
person must resort to other means of communication when they are in
the same room (if they do not choose to go into different locations to
place a telephone call to one another). In such instances, such as a visit
to a dentist’s office, the other parts of the ADA may provide coverage.
However, as described earlier in this Article, there are serious
noncompliance issues with respect to those parts of the ADA.
C. Lessons from Title IV
Title IV’s success is all the more remarkable because Title IV evolved
from the same principle as Titles I through III—that covered entities
(here, common carriers), and not deaf people, should take responsibility
for paying for the accommodations necessary to ensure effective
communication. Like Titles I through III, Title IV prohibits covered
entities from placing a surcharge on deaf consumers to recoup the cost of
providing accommodations.147
146
See In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with
Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 19 FCC Rcd. 12475, 12537, n.466 (2004); In re Telecomms.
Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities,
16 FCC Rcd. 4054, 4058 (2000) (explaining that VRS is reimbursable through TRS funds
while VRI is not); see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,196 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35) (“The FCC has made clear that VRS functions as a telephone service and is not
intended to be used for interpreting services where both parties are in the same room; the
latter is reserved for VRI. The Department agrees that VRS cannot be used as a substitute
for in-person interpreters or for VRI in situations that would not, absent one party’s
disability, entail use of the telephone.”).
147
47 U.S.C. § 225(d)(1)(D) (2006) (prohibiting common carriers from charging relay users
greater rates than for functionally equivalent voice calls); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2010)

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/7

Stein and Teplin: Rational Discrimination and Shared Compliance: Lessons from Title

2011]

Lessons from Title IV of the ADA

1127

As discussed in Part III, Titles I through III impose the cost of
communication access on the individual entity that happens to be
approached by a deaf person. As we have explained, the dentist is faced
with a very real economic reason to disregard her legal obligation and
not provide an interpreter: she believes she will lose money on the deaf
patient in doing so. Making matters worse, if the dentist does fulfill her
legal obligation, she might be approached by every deaf individual in
the vicinity who was denied interpreter services by discriminatory
dentists. The result is a race to the bottom as covered entities seek to
evade the costs of complying with the law even when such evasion risks
safety, as in the Lockhart case when FedEx did not provide an interpreter
for its deaf employee during meetings regarding its safety protocol. It
also poses the prospect of disenchantment among those who do fulfill
their legal obligation and thus take on a comparatively larger and
inequitable share of the cost of communication access relative to their
competitors, as in the case of the attorneys receiving referrals from the
Midwest Center on Law and the Deaf.
Title IV avoids these compliance problems by requiring
telecommunication companies to share the cost of access regardless of
whether and to what degree deaf people use their services. The sharedfunding mechanism makes it impossible for covered entities to engage in
the sort of cost-benefit analysis that encourages economically rational
discrimination. The shared funding mechanism introduces a different
kind of economic analysis that encourages equal access. The question is
not “how much money will I lose by paying for an interpreter?” Rather,
the question becomes, “how much will I benefit from interacting with
the person whose deafness is incidental?” If FedEx were a participant in
a shared funding scheme and did not have to pay on the margin for
interpreter services, it is entirely possible that Ronald Lockhart would
still be working there today.
When covered entities can consider only how much they can benefit
from communicating with deaf people, economically rational
discrimination disappears. In its place, a vibrant marketplace springs up
as covered entities compete for deaf customers. In establishing a
marketplace for relay services, the FCC created financial incentives for
businesses to develop advancements in relay services technology which
have made telephone services even further accessible to deaf people.

(prohibiting surcharges by Title II entities); id. § 36.301(c) (same prohibition on Title III
entities).
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The FCC has analogized Title IV’s funding mechanism to “taxes
levied solely on telecommunications providers.”148 Yet Title IV is not a
subsidy program that might result in stigmatization.149 Its sole purpose
is to redistribute the cost of accommodation within the
telecommunications industry to ensure that the industry can meet its
obligations to ensure equal access for deaf people. Title IV simply
applies a “pay upfront” approach to meeting the obligation to ensure
effective communication while still staying squarely within the civil
rights and antidiscrimination paradigm of the ADA.150
What if we could import Title IV’s shared funding mechanism into
the other titles of the ADA? To analogize to dentistry, it would be as if
the American Dental Association anticipated that its members would be
approached by deaf patients and mandated that dentists contribute to a
communication access fund based on their proportionate revenues; the
fund would pay for interpreter services for deaf patients no matter
which dentist they chose. We posit that the outcome would result in
higher compliance rates. Further, from a normative perspective, no
single business would have to pay more to ensure effective
communication with a deaf person simply because the deaf person chose
to interact with it rather than one of its competitors. Rather, the cost of
access would be spread equitably across all members of the industry or
society.
We do not argue that aligning economic incentives with access will
completely eliminate discrimination. Rather, we argue that it will
eliminate economic incentives to discriminate, greatly boosting
compliance rates, which would realize the promise of the ADA of
including deaf people in all aspects of society. If covered entities still
refused to provide the necessary auxiliary aids and services despite the
absence of an economically rational reason to do so, it would be much

148
In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities & the ADA
of 1990, 9 FCC Rcd. 1637, 1640 n.25 (1993).
149
Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108
YALE L.J. 967, 1041 (1999) (reviewing “troubling evidence” that employment subsidies can
stigmatize the workers it seeks to assist and therefore “harm [those workers’] employment
prospects”).
150
In this way, Title IV also addresses another problem with the economic model of
Titles I through III on which we have not elaborated, namely the presumption that entities
know of their legal obligation to ensure effective communication and how to fulfill it. Of
course, many entities approached by deaf individuals have little or no experience with deaf
people and do not know how to achieve effective communication. Title IV provides
economic incentives for relay service providers to advertise their services and make their
services user-friendly, reducing the need for consumers to invest time and resources in
determining which services, if any, to use.
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easier to impute a discriminatory motive such as animus towards deaf
people.
We recognize that Title IV’s shared funding mechanism has not been
without problems. In recent years, several relay service providers went
beyond engaging in legitimate competition and began manufacturing
demand for their services by hiring people to make telephone calls
which served no purpose other than to inflate the number of relay
minutes for which they could seek reimbursement.151 The Department of
Justice has initiated prosecutions of individuals engaging in this
practice.152 More recently, the FCC has begun instituting stricter rules
such as limiting the reimbursement that relay service providers can
receive for services provided to their own deaf employees.153 We believe
that this enhanced regulatory oversight will reduce the potential for
fraud and abuse.
Despite the need to guard against abuse, Title IV has succeeded
remarkably in rendering telephone services accessible and has been far
more effective in eliminating communication barriers than the other
titles of the ADA.
V. BRINGING TITLE IV INTO TITLES I, II, AND III: SEMI-VOLUNTARY
COLLECTIVE COMPLIANCE
In recent years, several Title III entities have begun adopting
mechanisms for spreading the cost of the auxiliary aids and services
necessary to ensure effective communication with deaf people. We
describe several such instances below and then explore the implications
of expanding the shared funding approach outside the context of Title
IV.
Breitbach v. St. Cloud Driving School illustrates how the lessons of Title
IV were applied on a small, local scale. In that case, several deaf
teenagers sued five driver’s education schools in St. Cloud, Minnesota,
all of which denied them communication access to the classes they
offered.154 In settling their dispute, the parties might have agreed that
the school contacted by each deaf person would be responsible for
paying for the cost of interpreter services. That is what Title III requires,
but it would have prejudiced schools that happened to be contacted by
151
See, e.g., In re Structure & Practices of the Video Relay Serv. Program, 25 FCC Rcd.
1868, 187071 (2010).
152
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Six Charged in Nationwide
Scheme to Defraud the FCC’s Video Relay Service Program (Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-crm-1258.html.
153
In re Structure & Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. at 1869–71.
154
See Civil No. 06-1222 (DWF/RLE), 2006 WL 2265170 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2006).
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the deaf person and resulted in a potentially uneven allotment of
responsibility to pay for interpreters. All of the schools, after all, had
engaged in the exact same kind of discrimination.
Instead, pursuant to a consent decree, the parties agreed that all five
schools would share the cost of providing auxiliary aids and services to
the plaintiffs and all future deaf students. The schools agreed to jointly
offer a class accessible to deaf and hard of hearing people three times a
year. Each school was to pay for a portion of the class based on its
relative size and revenue.155 If no deaf student approached any school
for driver education, the schools would not be required to host the
accessible class; funding for the accessible class, however, was set aside
preemptively. Plaintiffs who had not yet commenced driver education
training could approach the school of their choice, but all the schools
shared the cost of providing auxiliary aids and services no matter which
school the plaintiff chose.156
The consent decree did not permit driving schools to evade their
legal obligations. The driving schools were still responsible for ensuring
communication access on their own. In compelling local competitors to
share the cost of communication access, however, it checked the
economic disincentives to avoid compliance in the future. No school
would be economically punished for opening its doors to deaf people
when its competitors refused. In addition, the schools would no longer
be caught off guard by a deaf person’s request for an interpreter; money
was already allocated for the purpose in advance.
In another example of the collective compliance approach to
communication access in Minnesota,157 emergency medical providers in
the Minneapolis-St. Paul area established the Twin Cities Hospital
Interpreter Consortium (“the consortium”), partly as a result of pending
litigation against several emergency medical services providers that
failed to ensure effective communication with deaf patients and family
members.158 Each hospital pays an interpreter agency a monthly fee for
the agency’s guarantee that it will provide an “on call” qualified medical
interpreter within an hour eighty percent of the time and within two

See id. at *3–4.
See id. at *3.
157
Plaintiffs in Breitbach and the hospital cases that led to the consortium were
represented by Rick Macpherson of the Minnesota Disability Law Center.
158
See Minnesota Hospital Consortium Agreement (on file with authors). There are forty
interpreters in Minnesota qualified to interpret in the medical setting; three interpreters are
“on call” at any given time under the consortium agreement. Id.
155
156
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hours one hundred percent of the time. The hospitals pay an additional
amount proportionate to their use of the service.159
As with the driver education schools, there are a few features of the
consortium that work to remove the typical economic disincentives
plaguing compliance with Titles I through III. First, the cost of
communication access is spread among several competitors, so none will
be at a competitive disadvantage when it is required to provide
interpreter services for a deaf person. In addition, the entities have
already paid for the availability of interpreter services in advance of a
particular request, so the economic pressure to find the cheapest way
possible to communicate is greatly reduced. Indicative of the success of
this approach, complaints about the accessibility of the consortium
members’ emergency rooms have been virtually nonexistent while the
hospitals continue to be accused of failing to ensure effective
communication outside the emergency room context—i.e., in-patient
care—which the fund does not cover.160
These examples of voluntary shared compliance in Minnesota reflect
the resolution of lawsuits. Other efforts to collectively pay for auxiliary
aids and services that have not arisen from litigation work similarly by
preemptively assessing a small tax on a large group of individuals or
entities in anticipation of the need to communicate with deaf or hard of
hearing people. Several local bar associations,161 and at least one state,162
have established so-called “communication access funds” (“CAFs”)
through which attorneys can seek at least partial reimbursement when
they provide interpreter services to deaf clients or potential clients.
CAFs are typically paid for through bar association member fees.163
However, it appears that many CAFs implemented as pilot projects have
not been renewed beyond the initial period, and that many bar members
(and deaf clients) are unaware of their existence. Moreover, most CAFs
159
Interview with Martha Barnum, Commc’n Servs. for the Deaf, in St. Paul, Minn. (Nov.
1, 2010). Of course, this system retains a certain degree of economic disincentive to provide
interpreter services because hospitals must pay an additional amount proportionate to
their use of the interpreter services. Because, however, the hospitals pay a portion of the
amount upfront, their economic disincentives not to use the service are reduced.
160
Id.
161
See, e.g., Sign Language Interpreter Fund Reimbursement Application, PENN. B. ASS’N,
http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/disabili/Sign%20Lang.pdf (last visited Nov.
8, 2010); see also Sign-Up Fund, ADVOCACY INC., www.advocacyinc.org/SignUpFunFlyer.
pdf (describing one year pilot program from Texas State Bar Association ending fall 2008).
162
See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 48-A(4)(2009).
163
For more information about the particular strengths and weaknesses of existing and
previous CAFs, see Rosenblum, supra note 94, at 1077–87. See also Communication Access
Funds for Legal Services, NAT’L ASS’N DEAF, http://www.nad.org/issues/justice/lawyersand-legal-services/communication-access-funds (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
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have been hindered by various restrictions on their applicability. For
example, CAFs might limit attorneys’ usage to a certain monetary
amount, or they might cover only some types of auxiliary aids and
services.164 As this illustration should make clear, shared compliance
must be required in order to have a lasting effect, and shared funding
mechanisms are most effective when they fully cover the cost of auxiliary
aids and services.165
We applaud these efforts to implement shared funding mechanisms
which reduce or eliminate disincentives to provide equal access to deaf
people. Although limited in scope, these examples show that there are
ways to avoid the pitfalls of economically rational discrimination while
staying within an antidiscrimination paradigm.
VI. BUILDING ON TITLE IV’S SUCCESS: POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANDING SHARED
FUNDING
Title IV’s success lies in its compulsory industry-wide cost-sharing
mechanism which ensures the accessibility of telecommunications
services and has spurred a new marketplace for businesses to provide
relay services. As Part VI made clear, its approach to compliance can be
incorporated on large and small scales, with or without litigation, and in
the absence of any regulatory or congressional mandate. In this Part, we
explore three possible mechanisms for expanding the benefits of Title IV
outside the realm of telephone services while also recognizing their
drawbacks and limitations.
A. Implement Mandatory CAFs
The regulations for Titles I through III or the statutes themselves
could be amended to establish a shared-funding mechanism similar to
that found in the FCC’s regulations for Title IV. For example, the EEOC,
which is charged with implementing Title I, and the DOJ, which is
charged with implementing Titles II and III, could establish a sharedfunding scheme requiring covered entities to contribute to a fund which
would fully fund the cost of any auxiliary aids and services necessary to
ensure effective communication with deaf people.

See Rosenblum, supra note 94, at 1086–87.
CAFs have also generally required attorneys to pay the full cost of communication
access up front and then seek reimbursement later, thus evading one of the crucial aspects
of Title IV’s structure:
telecommunications companies’ obligation to pay for
communication access is entirely fulfilled in advance, before any deaf person attempts to
access their services.
164
165
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These new funds could work in the same way as the TRS fund, by
making payments to entities which provide auxiliary aids and services.
For example, an agency that provides interpreters (remotely or on-site)
or real-time captioning could provide the service free of charge to the
covered entity and then bill the fund at rates set by the government
regulator. As with TRS providers, these providers of auxiliary aids and
services would have economic incentives to find innovative ways to
deliver auxiliary aids and services to those who need them. They might
distribute videophones or software free of charge to encourage the use of
VRI or remote captioning. They could also station interpreters in public
spaces to provide interpreter services for a few minutes at a time as
needed.
Although covered entities would have to make contributions upfront
to such a fund, we do not think that this proposal amounts to a tax
increase. Covered entities are already legally obligated to pay for the
provision of auxiliary aids and services when necessary to ensure
effective communication with deaf people. In theory, mandatory CAFs
would not change the amount of auxiliary aids and services procured;
rather, they would reallocate these expenditures in a manner
commensurate with an entity’s size instead of its happening to encounter
a deaf person and compel entities to obtain such services in advance of
those encounters.
However, because the adoption of mandatory CAFs would eliminate
economic disincentives for compliance, we expect that this would result
in greater demand for auxiliary aids and services. As a result, total
expenditures on auxiliary aids and services would likely increase. This
rise in expenditures would be countered by savings due to the reduction
in litigation and increases in productivity as hearing people and deaf
people are able to communicate more effectively with one another.166
B. Eliminate Title IV’s Restriction on Funding Relay Between People in the
Same Room
Another proposal is to remove the FCC’s reimbursement restriction
on relay calls when the deaf person and the hearing person are in the
same room. Removing this limitation would result in much broader
access to on-the-spot interpreter services. A deaf person could go to a
lawyer’s office and be able to pull up an interpreter immediately on a
laptop computer with a webcam or even on his iPhone or iPad. The
166
While we favor a broader approach, CAFs could also be introduced on a more limited
scale, covering for example health care providers and lawyers or only a particular
geographic region.
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dentist would have no financial incentive to object to the use of relay
services since it would cost her nothing. She would even benefit from
smoother communication with her deaf patient.167 The same would
occur when a deaf person needed to communicate with a coworker, a
teacher, or even a police officer.
Even more broadly, expanding relay services would result in greater
and much improved communication between deaf and hearing people in
every context, not just interactions with covered entities which are
employers with fifteen or more employees, state or local government
agencies, and places of public accommodation. Rather, deaf people
would have instant access to interpreting services when communicating
with anyone. This could be a cousin at a family reunion. This could be a
random person on the street who comes up to the deaf person to ask for
directions. This could be a priest or rabbi (the ADA exempts religious
entities from coverage168). Deaf people would, for the first time, truly
have access to all aspects of society through relay services. Relay could
become seamlessly integrated into daily life, much like a public utility.
The technology already exists to provide remote interpreting
services to facilitate communication between hearing people and deaf
people who are located in the same room. Title IV’s relay void has
already been filled, to an extent, by video relay interpreting (“VRI”). VRI
providers offer video interpreting services for individuals who are in the
same room.
VRI incorporates the same technology as VRS:
videoconferencing equipment that permits the sign language interpreter
and the deaf person to see each other and the interpreter and hearing
person to hear one another. VRS and VRI differ only in the payment
mechanism. Whereas VRS draws on the TRS fund, VRI providers charge
users directly for the services provided.169

167
Interpreters, of course, are not exclusively “for” deaf people; rather, they assist two (or
more) individuals who wish to communicate but do not speak the same language. They
are as much “for” the hearing person who does not know ASL as they are for the deaf
person who does. See Tim Wells, Moving Mountains: Disabled Lawyers at the Top of Their
Trade, WASH. LAW., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 25.
168
42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2006).
169
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services,
75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,195–96 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35) (“Both VRI
and VRS use a remote interpreter who is able to see and communicate with a deaf person
and a hearing person, and all three individuals may be connected by a video link. VRI is a
fee-based interpreting service conveyed via videoconferencing where at least one person,
typically the interpreter, is at a separate location. VRI can be provided as an on-demand
service or by appointment. VRI normally involves a contract in advance for the interpreter
who is usually paid by the covered entity.”); In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-toSpeech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 16 FCC Rcd. 4054, 4058
(2000) (distinguishing between VRI and VRS).
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VRI is often used in the hospital setting, when time is of the essence
in obtaining interpreters to communicate effectively with deaf people in
times of emergency.
VRI permits hospitals to begin providing
interpreter services almost immediately rather than having to contact an
interpreter in the vicinity and then wait an hour or more for the
interpreter to arrive. VRI also allows hospitals in remote areas to
provide appropriate interpreting services despite a dearth of qualified
local interpreters.
The DOJ recently promulgated new regulations governing VRI. The
new regulations define a VRI as “an interpreting service that uses video
conference technology over dedicated lines or wireless technology
offering high-speed, wide-bandwidth video connection that delivers
high-quality video images.”170 Covered entities choosing to provide VRI
must ensure that staff persons are adequately trained in the use of
technology, that there is clear and understandable transmission of video
and audio, and that the image is large enough to display the face, arms,
hands, and fingers of the sign language users.171
Recently amended ADA regulations endorse the provision of VRI as
a tool which may be used to ensure effective communication with deaf
people. The DOJ added VRI to its illustrative list of auxiliary aids and
services and amended the definition of the term “qualified interpreter”
to define an interpreter who “is able to interpret effectively, accurately,
and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using any necessary
specialized vocabulary” and who is able to do so “via a video remote
interpreting (VRI) service or an on-site appearance.”172
Although VRI is growing in popularity among public and private
entities, it suffers from the same fundamental problem as other auxiliary
aids and services. As is the case for on-site interpreters, public and
private entities must pay individually for the use of VRI should they
choose to provide the service. The economic disincentives hindering
compliance with Titles I through III make entities hesitant to sign a
contract with a VRI provider unless they are certain that they will need
to use its services.
In suggesting that Title IV could be expanded to include VRI, we do
not mean to suggest that VRI is always appropriate. As the DOJ has
recognized:

170
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services,
75 Fed. Reg. at 56,177.
171
Id.
172
Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 7

1136 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

VRI may not be effective in situations involving surgery
or other medical procedures where the patient is limited
in his or her ability to see the video screen. Similarly,
VRI may not be effective in situations where there are
multiple people in a room and the information
exchanged is highly complex and fast-paced. The
Department recognizes that in these and other
situations, such as where communication is needed for
persons who are deaf-blind, it may be necessary to
summon an in-person interpreter to assist certain
individuals.173
The DOJ’s recognition that VRI is not always an appropriate auxiliary
aid and service comports with its broader recognition that determining
the appropriate steps covered entities must take to ensure effective
communication with deaf people is context-specific.174 Notably, several
hospitals have been sued by deaf individuals who assert that VRI did not
ensure effective communication.175
Clearly, VRI is no panacea. VRI is of no assistance, for example, to
deaf individuals who do not have access to videophone technology or to
deaf-blind people. Deaf people have also cited the three-dimensional
nature of sign language as a reason for preferring an on-site interpreter
to the two-dimensional interpreter on screen.176 Moreover, the use of
VRI makes it more difficult for a deaf person to watch both the speaker
and the interpreter at the same time. For example, if a person is giving a

Id. at 56,196.
One complaint has been that health care providers have not set up and used the
technology correctly, meaning that the equipment often goes unused during times of need
or that the deaf person and interpreter cannot see each other well. See id. (noting “cases
where the video monitor is out of the sightline of the patient or the image is out of focus;
still other examples were given of patients who could not see the image because the signal
was interrupted, causing unnatural pauses in the communication, or the image was grainy
or otherwise unclear.”). The new DOJ regulations should provide clarifying guidance to
covered entities regarding their obligation to ensure that when they provide VRI services,
they do so correctly and in appropriate situations. Id.
175
See, e.g., Gillespie v. Dimensions Health Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (D. Md. 2005)
(identifying allegations that the VRI communication was ineffective “either because the
staff was inadequately trained and unable to operate the VRI device, because Plaintiffs
were unable to understand the video interpreter due to the poor quality of the video
transmission, or both”). In Gillespie, the hospital signed a consent decree. Consent Decree
Gillespie v. Dimensions Health Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 636 (D. Md. 2005) (No. DKC-05-CV73), available at http://www.ada.gov/laurelco.htm. In the decree, the hospital agreed to
modify its VRI policy. Id.
176
See Position Statement: VRI Services in Hospitals, NAT’L ASS’N DEAF (Apr. 2008),
http://www.nad.org/issues/technology/vri/position-statement-hospitals.
173
174
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demonstration on how to use something, the deaf person may prefer that
the interpreter stand next to the presenter so that both the interpreter
and the presenter are in the same line of sight. This is not always
possible with VRI.177 The National Association for the Deaf (“NAD”),
citing concerns about the limitations of VRI, has adopted the position
that VRI should be used in hospital settings only to “fill the gap” in time
until an interpreter arrives on site.178 On-site interpreters, as the NAD
explains, “have more physical flexibility, have greater access to visual
and auditory cues and information present in the environment, do not
encounter technology or equipment malfunctions, and can respond
immediately to communication events as they arise.”179
We note, however, that in our experiences working with deaf people,
many of the individuals who say they dislike VRI love their
videophones. As the skyrocketing numbers of reimbursable minutes
indicate, deaf people are spending more time than ever using VRS to
communicate with hearing people over the telephone despite the
problems with relying on an interpreter who is not physically present.
This increasing use of videophones suggests widespread acceptance of
the use of remote interpreters to communicate with hearing people.
In short, we recognize problems with VRI and VRS, many of which
cannot be fully redressed through technological advancements. VRI and
VRS should never entirely replace on-site interpreters. In our view,
however, remote video interpreting is the future of communication
between deaf and hearing people and its possibilities—instantaneous
access to interpreter services, anywhere, at any time—exceed its
limitations.
As described above, telecommunications relay services are paid for
by assessments on phone service providers that are passed on to
consumers through a line item on their phone bills. This present
limitation to common carriers makes sense because TRS ensures only
that the telecommunications industry is accessible to deaf people. Were
relay services broadened to include same-room communications,
demand for TRS would grow as hearing and deaf people looked for
inexpensive means to communicate productively with one another in all
areas of life. Ensuring the sufficiency of funds to reimburse relay service
providers would require an expanded revenue pool. It is not our
purpose in this Article to identify a specific funding mechanism, but to
illustrate the promises (and downsides) of removing the same-room

177
178
179

Id.
Id.
Id.
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restriction on VRS that has worked so well in rendering telephone
services accessible to deaf people.180
C. Expand the ADA Tax Credit
As we discussed above, the ADA provides small businesses with a
limited fifty percent tax credit of up to $5,000 for access-related
expenditures between $250 and $10,250.181 This tax credit does not,
however, broadly redistribute the cost of access because small businesses
must still bear a significant portion of the cost. Moreover, because most
small businesses are unlikely to encounter many deaf people, they may
spend less than $250 on interpreter expenses and therefore fail to qualify
for the tax credit (as might the dentist in our example who would have
spent only $90 in providing a sign language interpreter). The availability
of this limited tax credit does not significantly dampen entities’ tendency
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis, which in many circumstances still
leads to economically rational discrimination.
Another means of expanding the principle of Title IV—shared
funding—would be to expand this tax credit to cover all expenses
incurred by covered entities in ensuring effective communication with
deaf people. This approach would nearly eliminate economic incentives
for economically rational actors to discriminate because they would be
fully reimbursed for the cost of providing auxiliary aids and services.
As with the first two proposals outlined above, broadening the tax
credit would also broaden the marketplace for the provision of
interpreter services. With greater demand for interpreter services, VRI
companies, interpreter agencies, and freelance interpreters would
compete with each other to serve a larger market. They would likely use
the tax credit to advertise their services as “free” and look for ways to
make it easy for covered entities to take advantage of their services. We
predict that the VRI industry would grow as businesses would continue
to look for ways to provide interpreter services on demand without
having to search for on-site interpreters and pay for the time and
expense of bringing interpreters on-site.
180
We do not doubt that opening up relay services in this manner would result in
exponential growth in demand for relay services. We recognize that initially, there may
not be enough qualified interpreters to meet this demand. If there is a shortage in
interpreter services, we believe that it is due to a shortage in demand brought on by
economically rational discrimination.
We believe that once economically rational
discrimination is eliminated and deaf people have the same access to communication as
hearing people, market forces will correct any shortfall in supply. As demand for
interpreter services grows, so will wages for interpreters. This will, in turn, spur more
people to choose interpreting as a profitable and rewarding profession.
181
See 26 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2006).
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However, we do not believe that a one hundred percent tax credit
alone would achieve the same results as opening up relay services to
same-room communications. Some entities may resist the notion of
having to incur expenses and then seek reimbursement through the tax
credit, temporarily losing access to those funds. There is also an
administrative burden associated with applying for and receiving the tax
credit.
Expanding the tax credit could complement the expansion of Title IV
by removing economic incentives to discriminate against deaf people in
instances when the use of VRI would not be appropriate. For instance,
were the dentist to have a deaf-blind patient who could not see a remote
interpreter, the dentist could pay for a tactile sign language interpreter
and then obtain reimbursement through a full tax credit.182
D. Political Prospects for Reform
We believe that the political prospects for reform are good. The
ADA enjoyed broad bipartisan support when it was enacted in 1990, and
when it was amended in 2008 to broaden the definition of disability.
More recently, a nearly unanimous Congress enacted the Twenty-First
Century Act which, among other things, mandates more accessible
telecommunications devices for deaf people and people with vision
impairments.183 These reforms received support from the industries
regulated by the statute.
Disability rights legislation has enjoyed broad support because most
people know another person with a disability. Anyone can become a
person with a disability. Because disability can affect anyone at any
time, dialogue about disability often avoids the rancor that surrounds
race and sex discrimination.
We believe that proposals to redistribute the costs of auxiliary aids
and services would similarly receive broad support. The ADA already
places on covered entities the legal obligation to incur expenses when
necessary to ensure effective communication with deaf people. We
recognize that Congress faces increasing pressure to avoid government
imposed mandates, particularly on businesses. However, our proposal
to apply Title IV’s shared-funding mechanism to the other types of
182
Another possibility, which we do not consider at length here, would be to establish a
national agency responsible for scheduling and paying for interpreter services upon
request. We believe that the tremendous administrative burdens associated with such a
scheme would likely wash away the promise of real and instantaneous facilitation of
communication between hearing people and deaf people.
183
See Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-260, 124 Stat. 2751 (2010).
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industries and entities would not, in theory, increase total expenditures
because covered entities are already required to incur these costs. As we
explained above in discussing the proposal of mandatory CAFs,
adopting a shared-funding mechanism would simply reallocate
expenditures in a more equitable fashion so that no single entity is solely
responsible for the cost of providing auxiliary aids and services in any
specific situation.
We believe that the increasing demand for relay services
demonstrates that hearing and deaf people would support the expansion
of relay services, making it easier for them to communicate with one
another in real-time. From the perspective of industry, a broader
distribution of communication access expenditures will decrease costs
for those entities which do comply with the law. Noncomplying entities
would be assured that they were paying for communication access in a
manner that did not place them at a competitive disadvantage. Finally,
we believe that disability rights groups and industry would support
these proposals because they would reduce the need for, and thus
likelihood of, costly litigation to ensure compliance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Twenty years of FCC regulatory supervision under Title IV has
proven what should have been obvious when the ADA was enacted:
accessibility incurs real, quantifiable costs. If required to pay out of
pocket for these costs, businesses and government entities will more
often than not disregard their obligation or choose the cheapest—rather
than the most effective—option possible. If, on the other hand, entities
are required to pay for accessibility on a pro rata basis with their
competitors in advance of any particular request for accommodation,
greater accessibility will result.
In our ideal society, a dentist does not think about losing $40 on a
deaf patient’s visit, and deaf people can access all areas of society as
comfortably as they do telecommunications. The story of the deaf
patient would be a tale of one ADA, not two. Either the deaf patient
would communicate with his dentist by pulling up a sign language
interpreter on his iPhone, or the dentist would call an interpreter with
whom she is familiar, knowing that a communication access fund would
cover the expense or that she would be fully reimbursed through a tax
credit. We do not believe that this future is far off. In fact, the future is
already here with Title IV. Importing Title IV’s compulsory shared-

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/7

Stein and Teplin: Rational Discrimination and Shared Compliance: Lessons from Title

2011]

Lessons from Title IV of the ADA

1141

funding mechanism into Titles I through III will advance the ADA’s goal
of including deaf people fully in all aspects of society.184

184
Although we focus on deaf people in our Article, the lessons of Title IV are not limited
to deaf people. The shared-funding mechanism could also be adopted to ensure the greater
availability of auxiliary aids and services for people with disabilities in general. For
example, DOJ regulations also list as examples of auxiliary aids and services “effective
methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual
impairments” such as “[q]ualified readers.” 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104(2), 36.303(b)(2) (2010). A
shared-funding scheme could result in the greater availability of such auxiliary aids and
services, resulting in the fuller inclusion of blind people in society.
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